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NOTHING TO LOSE BUT OUR CHAINS: 
ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE, 
by Louis Michael Seidman1
CARISSIMA MATHEN2
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN’S On Constitutional Disobedience is a small book that 
packs a punch. In it, the Georgetown law professor offers a novel take on the 
endless debates over constitutional text, meaning, and interpretation in US legal 
and academic circles (and, for that matter, Canadian ones). Seidman argues that 
the entire exercise is a shell game. Why, he asks, should a mature democracy care 
about principles and rules laid down generations ago by a different polity? Why, 
in other words, should anyone care about the Constitution? 
Seidman’s answer, laid out in a terse 150 pages, is that “we”3 should not care 
very much at all. Caring too much leads to disingenuous arguments and dishonest 
politics that inhibit constructive resolution of social issues. Disingenuous 
arguments arise from a position of bad faith: Though everyone loves to talk about 
constitutional compliance, what they mean is compliance with the Constitution 
as they think it ought to read and be read. In reality, “almost no one changes her 
opinion on anything important just because of the Constitution.”4 Dishonest 
politics arise because, according to Seidman, people regularly violate the US 
Constitution when it compels actions or results that they reject. Thus, American 
constitutional traditions reveal an uneasy mix of performed reverence for what the 
1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 143 pages.
2. Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa.
3. The term “we” refers to the American polity.
4. Seidman, supra note 1 at 7.
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document says and deep cynicism about its (mis)use by one’s political adversaries. 
As for resolving social issues, Seidman argues that relying on constitutional norms 
designed by a long vanished society is nonsensical. 
In reviewing this provocative and engaging work, I largely adopt Seidman’s 
terms of reference, which are almost entirely American. Because, however, the 
core of Seidman’s argument draws on premises that should be applicable beyond 
his domestic framework, I also consider it in a broader context.  
Describing Seidman’s argument as an uphill battle is an exquisite 
understatement. Geoffrey Stone, editor of the Inalienable Rights series in which 
this book was published, admits as much.5 The series includes Laurence Tribe’s 
The Invisible Constitution,6 J. Harvie Wilkinson III’s Cosmic Constitutional 
Theory,7 and Martha Nussbaum’s From Disgust to Humanity.8 As Stone points 
out, while these works are tremendously varied, they all engage, to some degree, 
in “giving concrete meaning to the often vague and open-ended provisions of the 
American Constitution.”9 On Constitutional Disobedience, in contrast, argues that 
any search for constitutional meaning misses the point, spectacularly, because of 
the accompanying presumption that the document matters. That presumption is 
rooted in aspects of the American national psyche developed over some two and 
a half centuries. Seidman acknowledges its power and influence but insists that it 
rests on a profound, and ultimately insurmountable, mistake.
The thesis is presented in five chapters. After a section entitled “The Argument 
in Brief,” Seidman canvasses some ideas in favour of constitutional obedience. He 
views all of them as irredeemably flawed and asserts that alternative arguments 
do not exist. He seeks to demonstrate that constitutional disobedience is not 
only inevitable but superior to constitutional obedience. Disobedience, he says, 
is actually widespread and there would be no net negative impact if the entire 
notion of obedience were to vanish. And he addresses the implications of the 
notion of obedience to law writ large.  
In all, Seidman considers ten arguments for constitutional obedience, 
though he does not accord them equivalent treatment. The arguments run the 
gamut from formalism to political ethics to consequentialism. The first two are 
the most clearly formalist, for they rely on the US Constitution itself (specifically, 
the supremacy clause in Article VI), and premises about the inherent nature of 
5. Ibid at xi-xii.
6. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
7. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
8. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
9. Seidman, supra note 1 at xi.
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written constitutions in general. There are two “process” arguments: that “we the 
people” consented to the Constitution and that the Constitution contains within 
it the possibility of change by formal amendment. Next, Seidman presents four 
broadly consequentialist arguments: that the Constitution leads to good results 
because of the wisdom of its framers (Madison, Jefferson, et cetera); that this 
wisdom is reflected in the Constitution’s broadly prescriptive values, which even 
today enjoy a high degree of social consensus; that constitutional disobedience 
promotes social chaos; and that constitutional disobedience threatens civil 
liberties. The ninth argument is more theoretical: that, by enabling and requiring 
a more reasoned and sober approach to public debate, constitutions seek to avoid 
spur-of-the-moment political decisions. The tenth is that Americans appear to 
want to obey the Constitution.
Interestingly, none of the arguments considers the role played by a written 
constitution in a federal state. To the extent that he focuses on the exercise of power, 
Seidman is concerned with state-citizen relationships, that is to say, the general 
arena of civil liberties and other individual rights. He argues that the presence of a 
written constitution is not necessary to prevent “tyranny,”10 pointing to countries 
(the United Kingdom, New Zealand) that have avoided dictatorship despite the 
absence of enacted constitutional law.11 He argues, too, that there is inadequate 
evidence that the US Constitution has actually enabled liberty protection. But 
the book contains very little discussion of intergovernmental relations and the 
degree to which a written constitution might promote stability in such matters. 
It is almost trite to say that federal states must divide legislative authority, and it 
is unclear how they might do so without crafting some form of obligation that 
is out of the reach of ordinary politics. The division of legislative authority was a 
primary preoccupation of Canada’s first constitutional document; the enactment 
of individual rights and liberties required another century to manifest.12 Perhaps 
many of Seidman’s arguments—democratic (il)legitimacy, the political benefits 
of disobedience—would apply mutatis mutandis to federalism. But the “chaos” 
argument that Seidman tries to dispatch in the area of civil liberties has even 
greater purchase in a nation state with fifty-one governments unconnected by 
10. Ibid at 19.
11. In his review, Jeremy Waldron quibbles with this part of Seidman’s argument, noting several 
quasi-constitutional statutes in both the United Kingdom and New Zealand that regulate the 
practice of politics and reflect quite old and settled assumptions. See Jeremy Waldron, “Never 
Mind the Constitution” (2014) 127:4 Harv L Rev 1147 at 1163.
12. See Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c11 
[Constitution Act, 1982]; Constitution Act, 1867, (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 
1985, Appendix II, No 5.
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any common parameters for collective action or negotiation. It is curious, then, 
that an argument about the relationship between constitutions and federalism 
scarcely makes an appearance. 
Note, too, that while Seidman considers the desire to avoid chaos and tyranny 
as possible arguments in favour of constitutional obligation, he does not consider 
whether a written constitution might exert a far more prosaic pull: towards the 
status quo, the known, and the predictable. Under this alternative analysis, the 
issue is not whether abandoning the notion of constitutional obligation is likely 
to lead to better public decisions and political agreements. The issue is whether 
a constitution provides such a familiar benchmark for political negotiation that 
most citizens might view the costs of overturning it as too onerous even if they 
believed that the result of such an overturning might be a net gain. 
On Constitutional Disobedience focuses explicitly on US politics, history, 
and consequences. Seidman is perfectly entitled to argue that, in the American 
context, constitutional disobedience is justified neither normatively (because of 
its costs) nor ethically (because of the fatal flaws13 in the early democracy that 
produced the governing constitutional document). But he frequently elides the 
distinction between the US-focused arguments in his book—what one might call 
his empirical or social fact evidence—and the more theoretical ones. 
In order to see how this elision occurs, it helps to look at the argument in 
its entirety.14 Seidman first attacks what is often considered a strength of the US 
Constitution: Its longevity. His argument is simple. Because the Constitution has 
persisted for centuries, there is no meaningful connection between its framers 
and the citizens who now abide by it. The framers lived in a “small, preindustrial 
society”15 dependent in large part upon slave labour. They could not have 
anticipated the kinds of problems that now confront Americans. It is “impossible 
to imagine what they would have thought of women’s liberation, evolution, gay 
marriage, psychoanalysis, reality television, globalization or the war on terror.”16
Proponents of the so-called living constitution point to a constitution’s ability 
to act as a broad repository of social values that transcends generations. In this 
way, the argument goes, the US Constitution is a continually evolving testament 
to a society’s core political commitments, even if those commitments shift over 
13. Seidman, supra note 1 at 17. Seidman observes that, “Nothing like all the people participated 
in the Constitution’s ratification. Large segments of the population, including women, 
slaves, American Indians, and people not owning property, were mostly excluded from the 
ratification process.”
14. Ibid at 11-28.
15. Ibid at 11.
16. Ibid.
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time. Seidman is not convinced. First, some of the Constitution’s provisions, 
such as the “grotesquely malapportioned Senate”17 and the fact that the role of 
President is not limited to the person who actually wins the popular vote, are 
worded in such precise terms that they are beyond such transformative power.18 
While all provisions are open to formal amendment, the process is exceptionally 
difficult (indeed, Seidman describes the US Constitution as “more difficult to 
amend than any other national constitution in the world”).19
In any event, and this is the second prong of the argument, those provisions 
that are more malleable—like equal protection—present a fundamental challenge 
to the idea of constitutional obedience. This is because, for Seidman, authentic 
obedience requires submitting to a result with which one does not agree. The 
idea behind the living constitution, he says, is that certain provisions can change 
over time to support a result with which the proponent does agree. Seidman sees 
this not as obedience but manipulation. In that respect, he says, originalists—
who seek to confine constitutional meaning to a fixed point in time—are more 
consistent with authentic obedience. But originalists, too, fail to articulate 
persuasive reasons in favour of obedience per se.
Even if the US Constitution prescribes more definitive results, Seidman 
continues, those results cannot and do not establish its authority. If the results 
square with an individual’s values, then it is those values, not the Constitution, 
that prescribe how that individual will behave. If the results do not square 
with one’s values, the basic question remains: Why rely on “a past generation’s 
discredited moral intuitions?”20
Seidman recognizes that, in any society, people who espouse a variety of values 
will look for mechanisms capable of reaching a working consensus on important 
questions. Such mechanisms might include “systematically promot[ing] 
compromise,” “allow[ing] local communities to decide for themselves,” and 
“ced[ing] control to national majorities.”21 But, no “sensible person would 
cede the value choice to a relatively small group of people who knew nothing 
about modern society, who are long dead, and who held values that virtually 
17. Ibid at 12.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid at 17. While it is true that amending the US Constitution is not easy, Seidman likely 
overstates. One need only point to the unanimity provisions in the Canadian Constitution. 
See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 12, s 41. 
20. Seidman, supra note 1 at 13.
21. Ibid at 14.
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no American would accept today.”22 And yet, he claims, that is precisely what 
constitutional obedience requires. 
As can be seen from the above encapsulation, much of Seidman’s argument 
rests on factual premises about US constitutional history and politics. One 
example is his reliance on the centuries-old gap between the Constitution’s framers 
and current citizens. But most constitutions do not last nearly so long: Median 
longevity has been pinpointed at about two decades.23 Canada’s Constitution 
Act, 1982, for example, is within living memory of a large segment of the adult 
population, and a number of its framers continue to be active in public discourse.
Seidman argues that the US Constitution is rooted in a profound act of 
disobedience—the usurpation of the earlier Articles of Confederation. Enacted 
in the wake of the American Revolution to ensure a stable, continuing federal 
state, the Articles proved inadequate to the task. Nonetheless, they were a 
constitutional framework and, thus, commanded obedience. Yet the Articles 
were ignored at the 1787 Constitutional Conventions. Instead of amending 
the Articles, delegates opted to displace them entirely. Given that the framers 
exceeded the limits of their given constitutional authority, Seidman asks, why 
should anyone feel “obligated to obey their handiwork?”24 
One response is that by its very nature, constitutional transformation tends 
to be disorderly. Large-scale transformations require enormous expenditures of 
political capital. It makes sense that such moments would tend to be preceded by 
situations of some exigency or, more rarely, the exertion of focused individual will 
buttressed by exceedingly favourable circumstances. Seidman turns this argument 
on its head, claiming that “every new constitution begins with an act that is illegal 
under the previous regime.”25 The argument is clearly overstated as applied to 
every constitution, and it fails in another sense as well. Throughout his book, 
Seidman’s focus is intensely pragmatic—he is concerned with the constraining 
effect of constitutional obedience on practical politics. Yet his historical argument 
has little to do with practical politics in the here and now; at most, the argument 
demonstrates that the US Constitution has an uncertain provenance. Indeed, it is 
hard to believe that Seidman would accept the bona fides of the US Constitution 
simply because its ratification followed the process set out in the Articles of 
22. Ibid. 
23. See Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
24. Supra note 1 at 6.
25. Ibid at 27.
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Confederation. More is needed to support the argument that fidelity to the 
Constitution is politically misguided. 
Here, the slipperiness between Seidman’s historical and theoretical arguments 
is revealed. Consider what Seidman offers as the first possible argument “for” 
obedience: Article VI of the US Constitution, which states that the Constitution 
is the supreme law of the land. The argument is clearly meant to invoke legal 
formalism. Indeed, Seidman presents it as too silly to bear serious discussion. 
But it surely matters whether the argument responds to a query about whether 
the US Constitution should have any bearing for Americans or a query about 
whether any constitution could have a similar bearing for anyone. It is, of course, 
absurd to answer a challenge about the authority of constitutions per se with 
the fact that a particular constitution asserts supremacy. It is not at all absurd, 
though, to suggest that the supremacy clause in Article VI is relevant proof of its 
supremacy within the US legal system. Now, Seidman has other arguments why 
the clause is not sufficient proof. Still, taken on its own terms, and assuming that 
a system could meet Seidman’s other demands for democratic legitimacy and 
even generational currency, that particular formalistic argument works just fine. 
Seidman does, of course, offer plenty of other arguments. One, again 
articulated specifically with respect to the United States, is that federal and state 
actors have frequently avoided or minimized their constitutional obligations. As 
examples, Seidman cites Thomas Jefferson’s execution of the Louisiana Purchase, 
Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus during the height of Civil War 
hostilities in 1861, and Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion that the 
wartime internment of Japanese-Americans was not amenable to judicial review.26 
Even on their own terms, the above examples are not coequal. Executive 
actions based on the belief that prudential concerns matter more than precise 
constitutional dictates are different in kind from a judge’s decision not to 
intervene in a constitutional dispute because of separation of powers concerns. 
The point, for Seidman, is that such moments are not unusual. According to 
him, the system is rife with “unremedied constitutional violations by lower level 
officials.”27 A diversity of rules—including “the political questions doctrine, the 
mootness, ripeness, and standing requirements, the state secrets privilege, and 
various forms of sovereign and official immunity”28—means that many violations 
26. Ibid at 70-71, 73.
27. Ibid at 73.
28. Ibid.
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are never recognized. As a consequence, political actors enjoy the “authority to 
obey or disobey the Constitution as they choose.”29
The assertion that political actors regularly violate a constitution requires 
some clarification of the constitutional norms at issue because such norms 
manifest in very different ways. They can, for example, take the form of rules: 
bright-line boundaries that require very little else to determine their contours. 
The provision in Article II stipulating that the President must be thirty-five years 
of age is one such rule. So is Article I’s guarantee of two federal Senators to every 
state. Another kind of norm is captured by standards: baselines that determine the 
acceptable limits of state power but are inherently contextual, values-based, and 
judgment-driven. Many individual rights, including freedom of speech, the right 
against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against cruel and unusual 
punishment, are standards. So are many of the constitutional rules governing 
the division of authority, such as the federal Commerce Clause. And finally, 
constitutional norms may take the form of principles that are not intended to be 
binding in a legal sense. Given its origins as a constitution of enumerated federal 
powers, relatively few such principles have been applied to the US Constitution,30 
but they can be found in other systems, including Canada’s.31
Seidman does not appear to mean that actors regularly violate bright-line 
constitutional rules. Many such rules govern the political process, making their 
routine violation both difficult to conceal and highly risky. More plausibly, 
Seidman appears to be talking about the violation of standards. That is to say, 
he has in mind actors who make decisions knowing that there may be legal 
precedents throwing their preferred action into some doubt. It is not clear 
whether Seidman has a similar view regarding the prevalence of disobedience 
with respect to constitutional principles. 
The claim that actors regularly violate constitutional standards implies that 
those standards have fixed definition points. But the very nature of constitutional 
standards makes that unlikely. In part, this is because few constitutional disputes 
arise in exactly the same form. In part, it is also because in systems such as the 
United States and Canada, the arrangement of institutional authority grants to 
courts a special role in constitutional interpretation and adjudication. That role 
has specific consequences in terms of when a particular law or state action is 
appropriately labelled “unconstitutional.”
29. Ibid.
30. But see Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999).
31. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 161 DLR (4th) 385. 
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To be more precise, Seidman never explicitly considers the presumption that 
legislation and executive action is constitutional until a court rules otherwise. That 
presumption makes possible a balance between constitutionalism and the rule of 
law on one hand and reasonably efficient state action on the other. But, as well, 
the presumption of constitutionality avoids having to apply an ex ante analysis 
to every legislative or executive decision. Seidman would probably object to this 
presumption, or, perhaps more likely, find that such a presumption pulls against 
the very essence of constitutional obedience. For if a constitution is really to exert 
the pull on state officials’ decisions that constitutionalists seem to prize, would 
it not be most useful to have that pull manifest before such decisions occur?32 
Indeed, there is some recognition of this idea in the Canadian context, where 
all federal government legislation proposed in the House of Commons is to be 
accompanied by an attestation that federal Department of Justice lawyers have 
vetted it for constitutionality.33 Indeed, the recently defeated federal Conservative 
government came under criticism for changing the standards to be applied to 
such vetting, allegedly to reduce the need for amendment at the pre-debate 
stage. The change was consistent with a perception that that government was 
both hostile to the Charter and indifferent to the fact that some of its legislative 
initiatives were “manifestly unconstitutional.”34
Even in the Canadian landscape, though, it would put the case too high 
to say that the Conservative government regularly displayed constitutional 
disobedience. Given its numerous dramatic losses in the Supreme Court of 
Canada,35 the government had ample opportunity to express defiance, yet it 
did not. Regardless of the desirability of pre-vetting proposed legislation, its 
32. In the strictest sense, this would encompass an advisory function, which Article III of the US 
Constitution denies to federal courts but which is common in Canada. See Supreme Court 
Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 53.
33. See Jennifer Bond, “Failure to Report: The Manifestly Unconstitutional Nature of the 
Human Smugglers Act” (2014) 51:2 Osgoode Hall LJ 377. See also Roderick MacDonell, 
“The Whistleblower,” National Magazine (19 November 2013) <www.nationalmagazine.
ca/Articles/November/The-whistleblower.aspx> (discussing the lawsuit filed by now retired 
Department of Justice lawyer Edgar Schmidt).
34. Bond, supra note 33.
35. See e.g. Canada (AG) v PHS Community Services Society, 2011 SCC 44, [2011] 3 SCR 134 
(holding that a Crown Minister’s refusal to continue an exemption for a supervised injection 
program was unconstitutional and issuing an order of mandamus); Canada (AG) v Bedford, 
2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 (holding that three prostitution-related laws were 
unconstitutional); Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 
433 (holding that the Prime Minister’s appointment of Federal Court of Appeal judge Marc 
Nadon to the Supreme Court of Canada was void ab initio).
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absence does not make out a situation of constitutional disobedience in the 
way that Seidman seems to view the term. A demonstrated readiness to test the 
constitution’s limits is insufficient. 
Seidman’s suspicion of constitutionalism is explained, in part, by his origin 
story of how enacted constitutions first emerged in Western political thought. 
He describes constitutions as a technique for constraining executive authority 
following the dissolution of the divine right of kings. Constitutions were a 
method by which people who disagreed about political outcomes could agree on 
how to resolve such disagreement. 
Seidman challenges the need for such a “meta-agreement,”36 arguing that 
it often amounts to nothing more than coercion, especially if a constitution 
is crafted in the aftermath of political conflict. “Advocates for constitutional 
government,” he writes, “argue that once the agreement is signed, both parties 
are obligated to obey its terms.”37 Putting aside the tricky comparison between 
the terms of a ceasefire and constitutional design, while each party in Seidman’s 
hypothetical certainly would argue that the other is “obligated” to abide by what 
they have agreed to, that cannot be all that Seidman means. Most plausibly, he is 
talking about whether the parties can draw on the term “obligation” in a deeper 
sense. He claims they cannot. Any basis for obligation that rests on the document 
itself is prudential, not principled.38 Moreover, if the obligation does depend, in 
part, on the agreement itself being viewed as substantively just (i.e., separate from 
its status as the basis of agreement), then it is that quality of fairness that provides 
the real reason for obedience. The fact that the agreement takes the form of a 
constitution is wholly irrelevant.
A major plank in Seidman’s argument, then, is that the common 
understanding of legal authority, namely, as content-independent reasons for 
acting or refraining to act in a certain way, is unsuited to the kinds of issues that 
inspire constitutional debate. By setting out a framework for governance that 
usurps at least some independent reasons, a constitution represents the ultimate 
assertion of authority. One need not debate when to call an election, for example, 
if the constitution already provides the answer. Nor need one justify a societal 
commitment to something like “freedom of speech” if the constitution already 
entrenches it as a fundamental right. One gets the sense that Seidman views that 
sort of attitude not only as disingenuous but politically lazy. Throughout the 
book, he prioritizes on-the-ground, grassroots political deliberation. Instead of 
36. Seidman, supra note 1 at 23.
37. Ibid at 23-24.
38. Ibid at 122.
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acquiescing in the “intergenerational power grab”39 of a long dead people, he 
argues that people would do better to embrace “the duty we should all have—
to explain and justify our positions to our fellow citizens.”40 One of the more 
provocative points made along these lines is his enthusiastic embrace of the terra 
nullius involved in emerging democracies in the Arab world:
In countries with no condition of constitutional protection for civil liberties, 
constitutional obligation obviously plays no role. Yet, precisely because of this 
absence of prior obligation, there is vibrant debate and mass mobilization about the 
nature of and protection for rights. The very contingency of the rights—the very fact 
that they are not established and are up for grabs—leads ordinary people to value 
and fight for them.41 
One is tempted to ask which Arab countries Seidman has in mind and, more 
pointedly, whether he means to suggest that the people living there are content 
to establish their rights absent constitutional protection. No evidence is offered 
for the latter proposition.
One of the arguments that Seidman considers in favour of constitutionalism 
is that it guards against “predictable pathologies”42 by providing safeguards 
against too-easy resort to majority decision making that could imperil freedom or 
harm minorities. Seidman disputes the idea that, unconnected from the broader 
political culture, constitutions themselves do anything to buttress civil liberties. 
In this, he is probably correct. A constitution is only as strong a protection 
for a set of values as those values are alive in the citizenry. He fails, though, 
to adequately consider the extent to which constitutions can shape the public 
debate that contributes to and sustains those values. While not determinative, the 
expression of values in constitutional form can present a powerful counterweight 
to untrammelled majority rule. A constitution may provide a constraining 
influence against coercive state action. Indeed, it may spur additional steps to 
protect constitutional rights. 
Ultimately, one is left with the sense that Seidman’s quibble is not with 
the grand design represented by what most Americans would consider the very 
best parts of the Constitution. Though Seidman thinks that liberals advocate 
obedience to the Constitution only to the extent that obedience promotes 
liberal values, it is clear that he is sympathetic to many liberal aims, such as 
equal protection of the law and due process rights. What concerns him is a sense 
39. Ibid at 41.
40. Ibid at 28.
41. Ibid at 115-16.
42. Ibid at 41.
(2015) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL386
that constitutional obedience has descended into slavish devotion to a game of 
trumps that seeps the lifeblood out of public discourse. In this, he may well have 
a point. But the argument is pitched a little too high, and a little too abstractly, 
to offer a genuine counterpoint to the entirely ordinary expectation that practical 
politics is aided, not impaired, by governing one’s actions in accordance with 
principles that transcend the expression of popular will on any given day. 
